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I
INTRODUCTION
LABOR POLICY APPROACHES IN THE POST-REAGAN ERA

The accepted wisdom holds that liberal Democratic control of the national
government means pro-labor government with the federal authority as a
strong advocate of private sector intervention on behalf of workers and their
unions, while more conservative Republican administrations favor corporate
volunteerism, marketplace labor policy, and the exclusion of governmental
workplace intervention. Closely akin to and allied with this dichotomy is a
reading of very recent labor history, shared by neo-conservatives and socalled neo-liberals alike, which pictures the post-World War II American
workplace as suffering under overly powerful "bread-and-butter" unions. On
this reading, the powerful unions have caused America to lose the highly
competitive battle with the Japanese for world markets and economic
leadership. This neo-labor policy perspective rests on the myth that by
forcing higher and higher non-market pay rates and benefit levels the overly
aggressive unions pushed the world's leading auto producers to ruin.
A close look at two current labor policy issues raises serious questions
about whether these stereotypes reflect reality. An examination of both the
Reagan Administration's erosion of the common law trust rules that govern
the control of employee benefit investments, and its suggestions concerning a
desertion of the half-century old competitive model in labor law, raise doubt
about the validity of the stereotypical analysis of the relationship between
labor and the government. Pressure toward strict governmental regulation of
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employee benefit investment decision making, which was traditionally
controlled by private and independent nongovernmental trustees, and an
expressed interest in abandoning the National Labor Relation Act's
competitive free labor market model for a more "cooperative" framework,
each reveal a surprising conservative tendency toward central economic
control over employment and its benefits. Such central control traditionally
has been resisted even by more liberal governments.
Government control of the workplace may not always favor the traditional
beneficiaries of government intervention. As large corporate and financial
interests become more concentrated, and as they increase their influence over
both the government and the economy, pressure mounts for centralized
corporate management of the hundreds of billions in trusteed employee
benefit assets, and toward increased corporate volunteerism and workplace
cooperation. The erosion of trusts and the desertion of a competitive labor
relations model are both symptoms of the new American economy dominated
by corporate antitrust evasions, special acquisitions, takeovers, divestitures,
mergers, leveraged buy-outs, insider deals, financial strategies, investment
banking's juvenile millionaires, and extraordinary money managers.' The
current pressure toward the deprivatization of employee benefit investment
and employee relations decisions endangers traditional American
commitments to decentralized decision making-commitments threatened,
surprisingly, by a conservative government.
With the November 1986 election returns and the resulting return of
control of the national legislature to Democratic hands, new attention to labor
policy is likely. The preference of Edward M. Kennedy, Senator from
Massachusetts, for the Chair of the Senate's Committee on Education and
Labor, where "old fashion" economic and labor based issues are central, over
the Chair of the Judicial Committee, which is concerned with confirmation of
federal judicial appointees, including Supreme CourtJustices, where the focus
is more likely to be on the "yuppie" and social issues such as abortion, prayer
in public schools, crime, and family, foreshadows new attention to the basic
workplace issues.
The new attention to labor policy is also demonstrated by the move of
David Halberstam's, The Reckoning,2 and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Cycles of
American History,3 toward the head of the national nonfiction best seller lists.
Each offers a new, but not a "neo-," view of the issues that explain the decline
of old labor issues in the United States. Halberstam looks carefully at the
battle between Ford Motor Company and Nissan and attributes Ford's failure
more to bloated management, declining competition, and labor management
buddyism than to overly aggressive labor. Schlesinger looks again at the ebb
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and flow of thirty-year cycles in American political history and argues that a
private interest (Reagan Revolution) cycle is scheduled to end by 1990 and
that a new public purpose (Kennedy-Roosevelt) cycle is about to dawn.
There can be no question that today some confusion exists about the place
of the working person in American public policy. One leading neoDemocratic candidate for the Presidency, Gary Hart, writes of A New
Democracy: A Democratic Vision of the 1980's and Beyond 4 without providing any
serious discussion of labor policy or the everyday workplace problems;
meanwhile, New York's Governor Mario Cuomo, the current leading torch
bearer of traditional Democratic liberalism, speaks regularly of declining
union membership and the need for new cooperation between labor and
management along lines first outlined by Herbert Hoover before the
Depression. 5 A new discussion of the position of the working person and of
organized labor in America is needed; fortunately, it has already begun. The
American Catholic Bishops issued a letter on the economy which is critical of
current planning and priorities. 6 The letter warned that:
Partnerships between labor and management are possible only when both groups
possess real freedom to influence decisions. This means that unions ought to
continue to play an important role in moving toward greater economic participation
within firms and industries. Workers rightly reject calls for less adversarial relations
7
when they are a smokescreen for demands that labor make all the concessions.

The AFL-CIO, in response to declining membership and national opinion
poll results, has issued a report on "The Changing Situation of Workers and
Their Unions" which emphasizes that "[w]e understand that confrontation
and conflict are wasteful and that a cooperative approach to solving shared
present and future problems is desirable." 8 The counsel to the United
Electrical Workers has argued in The Washington Post for "bigger unions, and
fewer of them." 9
This article reviews two aspects of a conservative sponsored
deprivatization of the American workplace: (1) recently centralized
constraints on trustees of employee benefit funds; and (2) the contest between
a cooperative and a competitive model of labor relations.
A look at the erosion of traditional American commitments to common law
trust rules in the management of pension trusts, and at a labor relations
model based on competition raises serious questions about where the country
might be going. Is the wave of the future a search for something newer,
4.

G. HART, A NEW DEMOCRACY: A DEMOCRATIC VISION FOR THE 1980's AND BEYOND (1984).

5.
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1980); J. HOLF-WILSON, HERBERT HOOVER: FORGOTTEN PROGRESSIVE (1975); R. SMITH, AN
UNCOMMON MAN: THE TRIUMPH OF HERBERT HOOVER (1984). Hawley, Holf-Wilson, and Smith are
cited and discussed in A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 375-387.
6. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 42 (3d draft June 4, 1986).
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bigger, and more centralized; or is it a renaissance of past commitments to
freer, smaller, decentralized methods of decision making? The future
presents two choices. The first offers a society in which the affluent and the

successful are big, centralized, and fostered by governmental policy. The
alternative is a society of reinvigorated models of decentralized, noncorporate
decision making, emphasizing private protection of individual economic
rights. The choice is not simple; it confuses categories of the accepted
wisdom about what is liberal and what is conservative, about what is procorporate and what is pro-worker.
II
AN EROSION IN TRUST:

ERISA's CHALLENGE TO PRUDENT

SELF-REGULATION OF PENSION INVESTMENTS

Frederick Maitland, the great historian of English common law, wrote, "[i]f
we were asked what is the greatest and most distinctive achievement
performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence I cannot think we
should have any better answer than this, namely, the development from
century to century of the trust idea." 10 Today, however, federal
administrators experience increasing difficulty regulating investment practice

under codified trust principles.
This is the story of an erosion of trust. The Pension Reform Act of 1974
(the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA) initiated
regulatory practices that threaten a superior system of self-regulation."1
ERISA was a very significant reform; it is restructuring employee benefit
rights in the United States. Federal regulation is displacing traditional
American reliance on prudent self-regulation for the responsibility of
managing $600 billion in employee benefit trusts.
The need for legislation protecting pension and benefit rights had been
clear for decades. Employee benefits lacked enforceable, long-term
protection. Without legislation requiring funding, vesting, and full reporting
and disclosure, pre-ERISA benefit promises were unreliable. The closing of a
major corporation would have left thousands of employees holding
unenforceable benefit promises. The losses experienced in the early 1960's
with the collapse of Studebaker were dramatic, eventually paving the way for
federal regulation of pension law.
In enacting ERISA, Congress properly displayed a lack of faith in
corporate America's pension practices. More questionable was Congress'
weakened allegiance to traditional trust law protections against fiduciary
abuse. The fiduciary provisions of ERISA sought to advance the centuries10. F.

W. MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 129 (1936).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp.). For full support of the ERISA erosion of trust
theory, see also Leibig, You Can't Do That With My Money-A Searchfor Mandatory Social Responsibility in
Pension Investments, 6 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 358 (1980); Leibig & Rabinowitz, Social
Investments and the Regulation of Pension Investments: An Outline of Basic Materials, 9 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 173 (1983).
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long development of trust law-Maitland's "most distinctive achievement of
English jurisprudence"-one step further. But Congress imposed on that
system concepts of rulemaking and agency enforcement which were contrary
to its central precepts. That imposition threatens the flexibility, freedom, and
growth experienced under the prevailing, privately enforced, self-regulating
fiduciary system.
ERISA's system of fiduciary control is more costly, more intrusive, and
more burdensome than the system it superseded; it is also less flexible and
less efficient. ERISA requires federal economic planning and investment
regulation without guidelines or expertise. It results in the generation of
mechanical, quantitative rules to control qualitative decisions, forcing out the
smallest, most responsive, and often the most successful trustees. Agency
regulation of investment decision making cannot succeed in the American
financial environment. Traditional self-regulating trust law could do a
superior job.
A.

Common Law Fiduciary Rules: Principles of Trust

1. The English Foundation. Professor Isaacs wrote that "next to contract, the
universal tool, and incorporation, the standard instrument of organization,
[trusteeship] takes its place whenever the relations to be established are too
delicate or too novel for these coarser devices."' 12 Trusts developed with the
division of courts between equity and law. The early chancery courts acted in
personam, imposing duties on trustees, while the courts of law enforced the
plaintiffs' rights.
Sir Edward Coke battled Lord Chancellor Ellesmere over differences
between the rule of law and the equities of the specific case. Professor
Maitland saw "civil war and utter anarchy"' 3 avoided only by the "great
elasticity and generality" that equity provided. 14 Sir Francis Bacon viewed the
creation of trusts as a safeguard against both the anarchy threatened by
resistance to inflexible courts of law and the tyrannical control threatened by
the imposition of their edicts. 15
Professor Scott points out that the early chancellors succeeded "because
they acted pragmatically rather than logically."' 16 They dealt with each case
on its own merits, not as an occasion for rulemaking.
If they had been trained in jurisprudence they could hardly have developed the
concept of the use or trust. If they had been compelled to classify it [by legal category]
their freedom would have been much impaired. The truth is that under the guise of
enforcing personal duties they were evolving a new form of property interest .... It
can [now] be recognized that law and equity do conflict . . . and that equity has
triumphed. 17
12.
13.
14.

Isaacs, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1060-61 (1929).
F. W. MAITLAND, EQurrY: A COURSE OF LEcTURES 17 (U. Brunyate rev. 2d ed. 1936).
Id. at 23.

15.

A. W. ScoTr,

16.
17.

A. W. Scowr & W.
Id.at 8-9.

ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 (1960).
FRATCHER, Scorr ON TRUSTS 8 (4th ed. 1987).
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The English evolution of trusts established a triumph of freedom,
pragmatism, and flexibility. It generated an appreciation of decentralized,
self-regulated trust management and an awareness of each trust management
decision as uniquely unsusceptible to simplistic rule.
2. American Developments. English trust law flourished and developed in
America. However, three developments are distinctly American.
a. Corporate and professional trustees. As late as 1743, England restricted
corporate fiduciary service. American corporate trusts have operated widely
since the 1822 charter of Farmer's Fire Insurance & Loan Company.' 8
English trustees still receive no compensation unless expressly provided for in
the trust document, whereas American trustees have always been provided
reasonable compensation. 19 Corporate and professional fiduciaries fostered
the growth and increased the attractiveness of American trusts.
b. Codification. The United States has subjected trusts to statutory
provision since the nineteenth century. The statutes were confined, however,
to the codification of accepted common law principles. Until recently,
administrative rulemaking was avoided. By standardizing trusts while
preserving fiduciary flexibility and self-regulation, codification encouraged
their use in funding employee benefits.
c. The prudence principle and Harvard College v. Amory. Finally, the most
important American contribution to the law of trusts is the "prudent man
rule," enunciated in HarvardCollege v. Amory. 20 In 1830, Harvard College and
Massachusetts General Hospital complained that Amory, the trustee of
$50,000 of which they were the eventual beneficiaries, had mismanaged the
trust and lost $20,550.2 1 Amory had purchased shares in insurance and
manufacturing companies. He argued that he was charged with the care of
the fund, and that he had legitimately exercised personal discretion in its care.
Harvard and Massachusetts General countered that Amory had invested in
"trading companies, and so exposed the capital to great loss," and that
"insurance and manufacturing stocks [were] not safe, because the principle is
put at hazard." 2 2 The institutions also asked that Amory's investments be
prohibited since his intent in seeking a high return had been partially to
benefit the trust grantor's wife rather than to benefit solely the trust's ultimate
beneficiaries. Massachusetts Chancery Justice Samuel Putnam favored
Amory:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully
and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion,
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

Id.
Id.
26
Id.

at 27-28.
at 28.
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
at 450.
Id. at 455.
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the probable income, as well
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
23
as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.

The decision established the prudent man rule. It departed from the more
conservative English rule that required an absolute commitment to the
preservation of the trust capital. The American rule gave more flexibility to
trustees and money managers in a young, expanding nation. Recognizing
that there is often no "bright line" dividing safe and unsafe investments, the
prudent man standard eliminated risk as the sole basis for evaluating
securities. Rather, the standard could be more flexible, considering the
potential return as well. 24 With HarvardCollege v. Amory, prudence became the
guiding force of American fiduciary decision making.
The true nature of prudence, however, is difficult to define. In his treatise,
Prudence,2 5 the German monk, Josef Pieper, examines the nature of this virtue:
To the contemporary mind, prudence seems less a prerequisite to goodness than an
evasion of it. The statement that it is prudence which makes an action good strikes us
as well-nigh ridiculous.... [W]e tend to misunderstand [it] as a tribute to undisguised
utilitarianism. . . . In colloquial use, prudence always carries the connotation of
timorous, small-minded, self-preservation, of a rather selfish concern for oneself
26

But Pieper's true prudence, and the American prudence rule, are based on
realities which form the environment of concrete human action. To Pieper,
"[t]he preeminence of prudence means that 'good intentions' and 'meaning
well' by no means suffice. Realization of the good presupposes that our
actions are appropriate to the real situation ...and that we therefore take this
' 27
concrete reality seriously, with clear-eyed objectivity.
Prudent action is not fostered by simplistic rules applied without reference to
the facts, but is only possible case-by-case. Prudent action cannot be directed
by strict formulae. To require prudence of fiduciaries is to trust their selfregulation as the only option sensitive enough to respond realistically to the
complicated requirements of investment decision making.
During the first three quarters of this century, America fostered selfregulation of prudently managed trusts. Trusts became the preferred method
of funding employee benefit plans. By 1974, such trusts successfully managed
nearly $300 billion under provisions which would double that amount before
1984. Inadequate provisions for actuarial funding, vesting, and disclosure of
employee benefits-not a failure of traditional fiduciary control-generated
the need for ERISA. A privately enforced application of the trust duties of
care, loyalty, and prudence by independent private fiduciaries had proven
invaluable.
23. Id. at 461.
24. Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV., 603, 613 (1970); see also Shattuck,
The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for FiduciaryInvestment in the United States in the Twentieth Century,
12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1951).
25. J. PIEPER, PRUDENCE (1959).
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. Id. at 25.
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Administrative Rulemaking: Distrust and the Temptation to Control

During the same seventy-five years in which common law trust concepts
led to the self-regulation of employee benefit investments, American
administrative rulemaking developed as a more controlled system of
economic regulation. As early as 1927, Felix Frankfurter viewed the
development of administrative law just as Professor Scott viewed the
accidental development of equity. Frankfurter wrote: "[w]e are in the midst
of a process, largely unconscious and certainly unscientific, of adjusting the
exercise of [agency] powers to the traditional system of Anglo-American law
28
and courts."
By 1942, future Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge recognized "the
emergence of a new system, not less significant than the evolution of
chancery." 2 9 Frankfurter later commented that "[l]egal scholars have rightly
compared [the rise of administrative law] to the rise of equity." 30 Dean James
Landis noted that "[a]s rapidly as-indeed, sometimes more rapidly thancauses could be isolated and problems defined, administrative agencies were
31
created to wrestle with them."
Administrative law is a powerful tool. It combines rulemaking,
adjudication, and agency enforcement to create remedies for problems of
mass society with which no other legal tool can deal as equitably and
realistically. Administrative agencies concentrate expertise for controlled
problem resolution. The predisposition of administrative law for centralized
regulatory control, however, necessarily conflicts with the more subtle
requirements of self-regulating prudence.
In many areas of health, safety, and economic activity, rulemaking is ideal.
Equity pushed law aside from areas in which equity served best; so too,
administrative law has triumphed in many areas of American life. However,
just as Professor Isaacs found contract and corporate law too coarse to cope
with the delicate and novel problems resolved by trusts, administrative law is
equally ill-fitted to the most sensitive trust problems. Centralized decision
making, standardized guidelines, and concentrated expertise do not suit
investment planning.
Administrative law is susceptible to three relentlessly popular criticisms"straightjacketing," "industry capture," and "politicization." Regulation
causes a reduction in creative flexibility through the expanding straightjacket
and the related "tar baby effect." Straightjacketing occurs when an agency
must act without quantitative standards, exact boundaries, or precise
guidelines. Standardized rules are difficult to formulate where flexible
qualitative judgment and decentralized personal decision making are
necessary. Furthermore, once underway, ill-fitted regulatory management
28. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 614-15 (1927).
29. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
30. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 519 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
31. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 14 (1938).
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results in overregulation. It exerts "effort to enlarge the domain and the
specificity of regulation" 32 which will not retreat. The regulated activity
becomes more and more restricted under administrative efforts to fit it to
rules which do not quite seem to work. Once this expanding straightjacket
begins to tighten, the tar baby effect also comes into play. The tar baby
effect, 33 according to Harvard's James 0. Wilson, occurs
when an agency applies a regulation, perhaps a quite clear and defensible one, to
some single aspect of an enterprise ... only to discover that the effect of its regulation
is not what it hoped; as a consequence, it then seeks to regulate additional
aspects of
34
the enterprise in order to make the initial regulation 'come out right.'

Regulation reduces freedom for expansion and growth through industry
capture. Industry capture is the tendency of an agency to be controlled by
dominant forces in the industry that it seeks to regulate. Politically
sophisticated "bureaucratic clientism" in the airline, railroad, broadcasting,
food and drug, and other industries has been described by conservative
economist George Stigler,3 5 liberal historian Gabriel Kolko, 3 6 and
administrative law scholar Louis L. Jaffee. 3 7 Professor Wilson expresses the
concern that "[a]dministrative regulation will not succeed in constraining
business firms to act in accordance with socially valuable objectives because
agencies that administer these regulations will be 'captured' by or otherwise
'
serve the interest of the affected industry. "38
Systems of regulation must be administered through politically appointed
governmental officials. Accordingly, in any system of regulation, a potential
for politicization of the regulatory process occurs. The politicization of
investment planning is particularly dangerous because it is at once too flexible
and too rigid. The direction of investment based on a single political
philosophy is too rigid. The shifting of investment direction based on
changes in political administration is too flexible. Both inhibit sound longrange investment planning. Politicization occurs regardless of the philosophy
or principles of any given administration. A conservative government might
be anti-labor in its investment direction; a labor government might be antibusiness. The politicization problems intensify because the political majority
and control of the administrative process change. Decisions with regard to
long-term investment planning inevitably bend with the political wind.
Direction of large pools of capital through the regulation of pension
investments is a constant temptation to both conservative and liberal
governments.
32. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT
135, 152 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
33. The tar baby effect was first explained by James McKie in McKie, Regulation and the Free
Market: The Problem of Boundaries, 1 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 6, 9 (1970).
34. See Wilson, supra note 32, at 153.
35. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
36. G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965).
37. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973).
38. Wilson, supra note 32, at 157.
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ERISA Investment Control and the Desertion of Self-Regulation

1. ERISA's Culmination of Codification. In 1974, a single section of federal
law came to dominate the regulation of pension investments. With section
404(a) of ERISA, 3 9 Congress sought to complete the American codification of
fiduciary standards. That codification is organized around six basic rules
derived from the common law; each contains a slight innovation. Table I
presents these six rules with their innovations, contrasting section 404(a)'s
codified provision with traditional fiduciary concepts.
Congress sought to complete the codification of fiduciary standards by
authorizing strict prohibited transaction rules and agency enforcement.
Sections 406 through 408 establish absolute prohibitions of specified
transactions that offer serious potential for abuse. 40 The transactions listed
are very broad and would prohibit, if literally applied, many transactions
previously allowed under common law. Congress attempted to cure the
potential difficulties with such broad prohibitions by use of an administrative
rule. The Secretary of Labor, after consultation and coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, was given broad authority to grant individual and
class exemptions from the prohibitions. 4 ' Part 5 of Title I of ERISA gives
each agency extensive enforcement authority.
42
2. A Break with the Past. As postenactment commentary forecasted,
ERISA's six innovations of the common law revolutionized investment
practice. ERISA continues to revolutionize the regulation of pension
investments to this day. However, this revolution is not based solely on the
statutory provisions. While each innovation certainly has marked a change,
each innovation has also continued a previous trend. The radical step away
from the preexisting self-regulated system is not the rewording of these rules
but their placement within a scheme of federal rulemaking.
Federal regulatory control threatens to push aside self-regulating,
privately enforced trust principles as the dominant force in the management
of pension investments. Through reduction in investment flexibility,
freedom, and growth, federal regulatory control provides a potential for
industry capture.
Two recent DOL initiatives highlight these dangers. DOL's unsuccessful
litigation theory in Donovan v. Walton, 4 3 presents an effort to replace a flexible
equity standard with a mechanical agency rule and exemplifies the
straightjacketing and tar baby effects. A class exemption for Qualified

39.
40.
41.

29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-1108 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1982).

42. See generally Hutchinson, The Federal Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA, 22 VILL. L. REv. 15
(1978); Lanoff, Reportingand Disclosure and Prudence in Investment Under ERISA, 29 LAB. L.J. 323 (1978);
Ravikoff & Curzon, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV.

518 (1980).
43. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (mem.), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586
(11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
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Professional Asset Managers, 44 provides a classic example of the potential for
industry capture.
3. The Threat of Straightjacketing Through Mechanical Rule.
commentator noted just after ERISA's enactment:

As

one

The prudent man standard of the Act does not create exact standards of behavior for
fiduciaries but only establishes a general rule. The inherent vagueness of this
standard and the need to develop more precise guidelines... undoubtedly will create
initial uncertainty and may cause fiduciaries to be unduly conservative until the
parameters of the new standard are defined.4 5

Nearly four years after enactment of ERISA, DOL first issued "prudence
rule" regulations that were designed, in part, to correct overly rigid reactions
to the statute itself.46 They recognized that in the equity tradition, courts,
rather than a regulatory agency, should ultimately control the rule's
interpretation. DOL emphasized that -[t]he Department is of the opinion
that generally, the relative riskiness of a specific investment or investment
course of action does not render such an investment per se prudent or per se
imprudent." 47 Initially, the codified prudence rule was officially presented as
an extension of a flexible common law tradition. No simple per se first
criterion test was foreseen. Like his common law forebearer, the ERISA
trustee was cautioned to consider carefully all aspects of each specific
investment opportunity. He was not to rely on mechanical rules. 48
Almost immediately, DOL faced the argument that a single per se first
criterion rule should be imposed on all investment decision making.
Members of the established investment management community argued that
with ERISA, return maximization should be the first litmus test of all
investments: the trustee should first insure that return is maximized, then
apply other fiduciary judgments. 4 9 Reverence for that theory, which obviously
predated ERISA, resulted in pressure to control investment decision making
through an express rule. The agency, however, held to its no per se rule
position. Pressure for more definitive opinion letters and regulations
mounted.
In January, 1981, a Labor Department advisory opinion letter adopted the
view that, "a mortgage interest rate charged by a plan that is below the stated
rate of other lenders of similar loans may, under certain circumstances, be a
'reasonable rate of interest' within the meaning of section 408(b)(1) of
ERISA. "' 50 This letter, from then DOL administrator Ian Lanoff to the AFL44. 49 Fed. Reg. 9,494 (1984).
45. Note, FiduciaryStandards Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 63 GEO. L.J.
1109, 1120 (1975).
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221 (1979).
47. Id. at 37,222.
48. See LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE PRUDENCE
RULE AND PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA (1980).
49. See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SHOULD PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED
FOR SOCIAL/POLITICAL PURPOSES, A POLICY FORUM (1979).
50. Letter from Ian D. Lanoff, Administrator, Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, to Robert A.
Georgine, Chairman, National Coordinating Committee for Multi-Employer Plans (Jan. 15, 1981)
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CIO's Robert Georgine, seemed to some to move toward a reasonable return
rule. It became the subject of continuing pressure for more precision. The
questions persisted: Was there a reasonable return rule? Could it work?
How could fiduciaries operate under its vagueness?
Late in 1981, DOL took the predictable step and attempted to establish a
uniform mechanical test for all ERISA investments. In Donovan v. Walton, 5 '
the DOL brought suit against various trustees of a large union pension fund
for breach of their fiduciary duties alleging, inter alia, that a ten percent rate
of return on a self-funded construction project was below the prevailing or
market rate and that its approval by the trustees, therefore, was a violation of
ERISA's prudent person standard. 52 After a bench trial in 1983, the district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to
the prudence issue and, in a later issued opinion, emphasized the traditional
53
common law derivation of the prudence standard.
On appeal, the DOL argued that ERISA contained a prevailing rate test
restricting ERISA fiduciaries to investments at the "prevailing or market rate
of interest." 54 The Eleventh Circuit flatly rejected the DOL theory by holding
55
that a reasonable rate may be different from the prevailing or market rate.
In the absence of additional evidence of imprudence, the rate differential
alone was found to be insufficient to defeat the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit's decision ended the DOL's
attempt to impose a mechanical test based on the prevailing or market rate of
interest as an absolute first criterion of prudence.
4. The Threat of Industry Capture Through Class Exemption. In 1975, both the
56
Labor and Treasury Departments published complex exemption procedures
for ERISA's broad prohibited transaction rules. 57 In December 1978, under
an administrative reorganization, DOL was given sole jurisdiction over
exemptions.58
In 1975, one exemption was approved. Eleven exemptions were approved
in 1976. Thirteen were approved in 1977. And twenty-two were approved in
1978. Criticism of the waste and inefficiency of the process spread. In 1979,
after a concerted DOL reform effort, eighty exemptions successfully wound
(emphasis in original), reprinted in M. LEIBIG, MANDATING SOCIAL PRUDENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR
52-56 (1982).
51. 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (mem.), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586
(11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
52. Id.at 1225 & n.2, 1238.
53. Id. at 1225-26 & nn.3-4, 1238-40.
54. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586, 587 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), aff'g 609 F. Supp. 1221
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (mem.).
55. Id. at 587-88.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1982 & Supp.); LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,

PENSION AND INVESTMENT

STANDARDS FOR EXEMPTON FROM ERISA PROHIBITED TRANSACTION PROVISIONS (1980).

57. 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1975); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982) (ERISA § 406). For a
discussion of the prohibited transaction rules, see Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing
Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1375 (1980).
58. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978).
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their way through the agency. 59 That is a total of less than 140 exemptions in
five years! Further criticism ensued. In 1982, 222 exemptions were granted;
and during the first quarter of 1983, over fifty were approved. DOL estimates
that nearly 1,000 requests are received annually. About one-third are now
60
granted.
Few exemption requests are flatly rejected, but many fail to complete the
process. Irving Baldinger of the American Benefit Plan Administrators
reports that "prohibited transaction rulings warn us that this is an area
thoroughly mined with booby traps for the unwary. Safe passage may be
negotiated, but only by way of an exemption process that is exceedingly
tedious, confusing, costly and time consuming."'6 ' The approval procedure's
cost and delay stymie more transactions than DOL disapproves. Jeffrey
Clayton, then DOL's program administrator, saw "literally thousands of
harmless situations [that are now prohibited]. . . . It takes three to four
months to acquire an exemption ....
[That delay alone] could lose a good
62
investment opportunity."
Raymond Donovan, Secretary of Labor at the
time, described "plan asset managers [as being] forced to choose between
applying for an exemption from the department, or foregoing a sound
investment opportunity entirely. Some managers often chose the latter." 6 3
On December 21, 1982, DOL proposed a solution to the inefficiency of its
exemption procedure. 64 Secretary Donovan unveiled the "broadest, most
flexible exemption ever proposed" 6 5 as the centerpiece in DOL's
deregulation program. Under the proposal, those employee benefit trustees
who turn their investment decision making over to qualified professional asset
managers (QPAMs) would be covered by a blanket class exemption.
A QPAM is defined as a bank (including certain savings and loan
institutions) with equity capital in excess of $1,000,000, an insurance
company with net worth in excess of $1,000,000, or a federally registered
investment adviser managing total client assets in excess of $50,000,000 and
with equity of at least $750,000.66
This regulation is a classic example of industry capture. The QPAM
regulations became final on March 13, 1984, with only minor, pro-industry
changes. 6 7 Its final approval means that benefit plans which are directly
59. Baldinger, Prohibited Transactions-The End of Innocence, 6 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE
171, 172 (1980) [figures updated by author through review at Dept. of Labor and with the help of
Phyllis Borzi, Staff Counsel, U.S. House Committee on Education and Labor]; see Leibig & Sartwell,
An Erosion of Trust: ERISA 's Challenge to Prudent Self-Regulation of Pension Investments, 9 J. PENSION PLAN.
& COMPLIANCE 357, 366 (1983).
60. Noble, U.S. Would Ease Curbs on Pension Investments, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1982, at Dl, col. 1.

61.
62.

Baldinger, supra note 59, at 171.
Noble, supra note 60, at D7.

63.
64.

Id.
47 Fed. Reg. 56,945 (1982); see Proposed QPAM Exemption Too Narrow. Should Be Broadened,
Commenters Say, 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 435, at 452 (Mar. 14, 1983).

65. Noble, supra note 60.
66. 49 Fed. Reg. 9,506 (1984).
67.

49 Fed. Reg. 9494 (1984); see Class Exemption Granted to Allow Several Transactions by Asset

Managers, 11 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 363, 385-97 (Mar. 19, 1984).
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managed by common law trustees are subject to a burdensome administrative
process, while those that turn management over to the established investment
industry are "deregulated."
Ironically, the largest, most professional
corporate investment managers, who are most able to deal with the
complicated regulatory process, are exempt from it. At the same time, their
businesses are substantially subsidized by the special treatment afforded their
customers.
DOL emphasizes that the exemption applies only to "established
institutions which are large enough to discourage the exercise of undue
influence upon their decision making process by parties in interest. '68 Labor
and trustee organizations disagree and see further danger of industry capture
69
by professional managers in this and related areas.
The threats of straightjacketing, industry capture, and politicization are
real. The traditional trust theory is that a private fiduciary selected
independently by a trust grantor should exercise the skill, care, and prudence
exercised in his own personal affairs. That traditional system allowed for
sensitivity to the individual needs of each trust. It dispersed investment
decision making widely. The system avoided rigidity and centralized control,
while preventing politicized investment practice. The traditional trust theory
provided for self-regulation and recognized the weakness in any mechanical
investment rule.
ERISA now threatens to replace this system with one which operates on
the basis of established rules and concentrates investment decision making in
"established institutions which are large enough to discourage" influence by
those with an interest in the management of the trust. This signals an erosion
of trust. A federal codification of traditional fiduciary concepts is being
overtaken by a distrust of independent fiduciaries so complete that the
greatest strengths of traditional self-regulating prudence are in danger of
being lost.
D.

A Return to Trusts and Self-Regulation of Pension Investments

A reappraisal of ERISA's investment controls is in order. Full disclosure,
benefit protection, and anticorruption enforcement must be maintained.
However, mechanical investment rules or class exemptions that fail to
recognize the importance of decentralization, flexibility, and widely dispersed,
individually-exercised investment control must be abandoned.
DOL should relax the presumption which prohibits transactions unless
expressly exempted. If, after thirty days notice, the DOL does not intercede,
a non-self-serving fiduciary should be encouraged to proceed with a particular
70
investment.
68.

Noble, supra note 60, at D7.

69.

See Fosco, Multiemployer Pension Plans Are Not Wall Street Investment Funds, NCCMP

Summer 1986, at 11, 13.
70. See Baldinger, supra note 59, at 177.
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Self-regulated investment decision making has a longer, more successful,
and more sensible record than ERISA administrative control can ever
establish. Congress should reestablish common law trusts, and abandon
rulemaking as the primary guide to ERISA investment decision making.
III
THE DESERTION OF THE

NLRA

COMPETITIVE MODEL

During the 1930's, the United States made a basic policy commitment
designed to generate and protect a strong decentralized national labor
market. The findings and policy statements included in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) set a course for private sector employee relations on
the basis of a national policy commitment to privately negotiated collective
bargaining contracts. That commitment has dominated union activity in the
United States for fifty years.
A.

The NLRA's Policy Directive

Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act declares it to be the policy of
the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstruction to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organizing, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of negotiatinf the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and protection.

The NLRA expressly finds that the denial of unionization rights injures not
only workers, but the country and its economy as a whole. 72 It emphasizes
that the inequity of bargaining power between workers and "employers who
are organized in corporate or other forms of ownership association,
substantially burdens" the economy. 7 3 Further, it finds that "experience has
proven" that the protection of the right to organize safeguards commerce,
reduces workplace strife, and encourages the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes.7 4 The NLRA proposed, and today claims to protect, private sector
unions and strikes as the marketplace counter to concentrated corporate
power.
The problem addressed by the NLRA was the inequality of economic
power between employers and employees in the pre-NLRA economy. This
unequal economic power existed, in part, because the government had
protected and nurtured corporations and other forms of organized joint
ownership while discouraging the economic consolidation of workers into
unions and enjoining workers' concerted strike activity. The NLRA redressed
this imbalance by protecting worker self-organization and concerted activity,
71.
72.
73.
74.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and by establishing a bargaining process while leaving the parties free to set
wages, hours, and working conditions.
The basic model permits the private bargaining process to establish labor
costs. Under the NLRA model, if management is unfair or pays insufficient
wages, labor may withhold its services by means of a strike. The strike puts
economic pressure on management because during the strike, management
cannot produce its products or services and thereby loses out economically.
The strike puts economic pressure on workers because they are not paid while
out on strike. Under the model, sacrifices on both sides should lead the
parties to a settlement acceptable to both management and labor. The
government leaves it to management and labor to settle their disputes over
the costs of labor through this private self-help mechanism. The government
protects the property rights of management through established common law
and corporate law. It protects the right to concerted labor activity and
collective bargaining through the NLRA. It protects both through a national
labor policy based on private decision making.
The theory underlying the NLRA is one of economic competition, power
balancing, self-help, and protection of concerted activity through strikes, as
vital to properly functioning labor markets. The NLRA's statement of
findings and policies 7 5 makes no special or express reference to a need to
increase cooperative communications, to foster merit principles, or to intrude
on behalf of the public as the third party at the bargaining table. While the
benefits to society of a smooth, efficient economy, free from interruptions due
to industrial strikes are emphasized, there are no provisions to avoid the
potential damage of protracted strikes, or to foster other cooperative,
protectionist, or paternalistic models.
1. The NLRA Model and Its Alternatives. The NLRA model is based on a
policy assumption which expressly favors the organization of workers into
unions which are granted exclusive bargaining power. The act is intended to
foster a national program of employee organizations, operating as
independent, separately empowered centers of market decision making
outside the government. The NLRA, a design for workplace democracy, was
intended to result in joint workplace decision making through competition. It
is very important to place that concept of worker rights into the historic
framework of the 1930's and the alternative models offered at the time. 76 The
1930's presented three alternate economic models-socialism, fascism, or
corporate volunteerism. The socialist alternative would have involved
nationalization of the means of production and was not a realistic alternative
in the American political and economic context.
The fascist alternative, which prior to World War II and the Holocaust was
not as quickly dismissed as it is today, would have offered a national
arrangement of joint worker-employer organizations with mandated wages
75.

Id.

76.

See C. GREGORY & H. KATz, LABOR AND THE LAw 223-52 (3d ed. 1979).
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and controlled prices set in a framework of government sponsored
cooperative structures. Fascist theory required mandatory participation of all
employees, professional and nonprofessional alike, in worker leagues, guilds,
or unions. The government would tightly control the relationship between
those employee organizations and mirror management structures. Economic
strength, world competitivism, domestic economic cooperation, and central
control were the object of the design. The system, credited to Mussolini,
"made Italy's trains run on time," generated a tremendous German
reawakening, built Japan into a world power, and was widely copied in South
77
America.
The third alternative, advanced by Herbert Hoover and others, advocated
utilizing advanced technology and new management techniques. Corporate
protection and volunteerism had dominated American labor policy since the
earliest stages of the industrial revolution. In the nineteenth century, Henry
Charles Carey called for a cooperative economy of associations "to prevent
the process of separation of [capital and labor]." 78 Hoover's views on labor
relations are largely unknown today. They would surprise many and are
strangely similar to the cooperative model offered by the Japanese today.
John L. Lewis, the grandfather of American labor, was a strong Republican in
the 1920's. In 1928, he called Hoover "the foremost industrial statesman of
modern times." 79 Hoover, a mining executive before becoming a politician,
described his ideas on the management of a mine in 1905:
The older mines ... were at that time very reactionary in their mining methods and in
their treatment of labor. Strikes were frequent. We encouraged the unions by
collectively bargaining with them. There were no strikes in our mines during
Our operations were a demonstration, an industrial fundamental anytime ....
labor-saving devices, lower costs, and larger
greater technical service, more
80
production for higher wages.

Each of the three models was rejected in favor of the less centralized, free
market-oriented power balancing of the NLRA. No one at the time believed
that the NLRA model could work unless it affirmatively fostered the growth of
effective, widespread unionism as the workers' representative in the
workplace. 8 '
B.

The NLRA's Commitment To Union Growth

As Paul Weiler has shown in some detail, the NLRA's encouragement of
unionization worked well:
When the NLRA was enacted in 1935 union density - the ratio of union membership
to the nonagricultural workforce - was only 13%. In just one decade, union density
nearly tripled, reaching 35%. After a postwar dip, union membership returned in
77.

See generally S.

78.

A. SCHLESINGER, supra

PAYNE, FASCISM:

COMPARISON & DEFINITION (1980).
CAREY'S MANUAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 516 (K.

note 3, at 232 (citing

McKeon ed. 1864)).
79. Id. at 37.
80. H. HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER, 1874-1920, at 75 (1951); see supra note 5.
81. C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, supra note 76, at 223-52.
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1954 to near the 35% level. Then began the slide -

to less than 30% by 1965, and to

just over 20% by 1980.82

Weiler offers the following graphic representation of the increase in which
density:
TABLE II
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During the early 1940's, unions won eighty percent of certification
elections. The NLRA policy successfully nurtured the development of unions

and collective bargaining into the mid-1960's. Again, Weiler has marshalled
8
that data.

82.
L. REV.
83.
84.

4

Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Se/f-Organization under the A'LRA, 96 HARV.
1769, 1771 (1983).
Id. at 1772.
Id. at 1776.
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TABLE III
THE CONTRIBUTION OF

NLRB

ELECTIONS TO UNION GROWTH,

1950-1980

Year
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980

Certification
Elections
(Eligible Voters)

Union Victory
Rate

5619
(890,368)
4215
(515,995)
6380
(483,964)
7576
(531,971)
7773
(588,214)
8061
(545,103)
7296
(478,821)

74%
68%
59%
61%
56%
50%
48%

Fraction of Voters
(Number of Voters)
in Union Victories
85%
(753,598)
73%
(378,962)
59%
(286,048)
61%
(325,698)
52%
(307,104)
38%
(208,313)
37%
(174,983)

Fraction of
Nonagricutural
Work Force in
Union Victories
1.92%
0.87%
0.62%
0.64%
0.53%
0.33%
0.24%

Why did union density decline so dramatically after the mid-1960's?
During that period, many changes occurred in union organization, employees'
self-interest in organizing, and management resistance to unionization. However, it is very clear that since the mid-1960's, the NLRA policy directive
encouraging collective bargaining as the preferred model for employee relations simply has failed to generate the intended level of union organization.
Today, the NLRA model, under which private sector unions are intended to
operate as significant market forces in the protection of labor and in lending
counterweight to concentrated corporate power, is facing rough times. More
and more, the corporate structures of the country are collapsing into a concentrated center of financial decision making.
As Lance Campa, counsel for the United Electrical Workers recently
noted: "[a] spiral of acquisitions, takeovers, divestitures, mergers, leveraged
buyouts and other gameboard moves by management began in earnest in the
1960's, paused for breath in the 1970's, and has taken off to new heights in
85
this decade."
A soaring national debt acts as a governmental transfer program from taxpayers to bondholders-that is, from labor to capital, from average working
people to wealthier people, from those who work for wages to those who own
the corporations they work for. With Reaganomic budgets, governmental
transfers from the wealthy to the middle-class evaporate. The tax code is
reformed to slash taxation of the wealthy. Political action committees make
corporate donations a driving force in political campaigns. Antitrust enforcement evaporates. Without strong nongovernmental, noncorporate power
85.

Campa, supra note 9, at K-2.
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centers, concentrated financial power is at least as serious a problem today as
it was in 1935 when the NLRA competitive union counterweight model was
developed. Consequently, the increased economic power of the corporate
employers makes it more likely that workplace decisions increasingly will be
subject to unilateral employer action. To counter the increased corporate
power, some have called for an analogous increase in union power through
86
"bigger and fewer unions."
C.

DOL Study Questions the Competitive NLRA Model

Into this environment, the Department of Labor issued a report on the
future of American Labor.8 7 The report, prepared by Deputy Undersecretary
of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs, Stephen I.
Schlossberg and his Executive Assistant Steven M. Fetter, begins with the
following preface:
Potential conflict between current Federal labor laws and labor-management
cooperative efforts has led the U.S. Department of Labor to embark on a study, using
its own resources and inviting the assistance of outside experts, to review the nation's
labor laws and collective bargaining traditions and practices that may inhibit improved
labor-management relations. The study is designed to assess whether the existing
framework impedes, or, indeed, totally bars, many of the cooperative efforts the
Department is encouraging and publicizing; and, if so, whether, through
interpretation or modification, the laws can be made to support both the ingredients
and the goals of labor-management cooperation rather than conflict with them. 88

Undersecretary Schlossberg is a prior General Counsel of the United Auto
Workers, a liberal Democrat, and certainly a friend of labor.8 9 The report
traces the history and success of a number of cooperative labor-management
efforts with special attention to the automobile industry, the General Motors
Saturn Project, and other similar joint endeavors. It calls for a reexamination
of the NLRA and federal labor policy, especially those portions of that policy
which are dominated by conflict, an adversarial relationship, or designed-in
impediments to voluntary labor-management cooperation. The report argues
that
[i]n fifty years, we have progressed from a time when employers held absolute power,
through a period when most employers allowed unions to set work rules and secure
virtually automatic wage increases in return for yielding any right to have a say in the
management of the company, to today, when some employers have come to
understand that the worker on the shop floor might be able to provide insights which
could help the enterprise succeed.... Clearly, cooperation and problem- solving offer

86. Id.
87. See generally BUREAU
DEPT. OF LABOR, U.S.

[hereinafter DOL

88.

OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S.

LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE

OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

(1986)

REPORT].

Schlossberg & Fetter, Preface to DOL REPORT, id..
89. Deputy Undersecretary Schlossberg is a past partner of the author and the source of
whatever intellectual stimulation generated this article. His ORGANIZING AND THE LAw is the
recognized standard guide to successful union organizing under the NLRA. The DOL report is
expressly designed to engender the debate which, it is hoped, is carried forward here. See generally S.
SCHLOSSBERG, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1984).
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more9 promise for productive labor-management relationships than the combat of the
past. 0

Whether the United States ever actually experienced a period when "most
employers allowed unions to set work rules and secure virtually automatic
wage increases" is highly questionable. Outside the automobile industry, and
perhaps a handful of similar sectors, no such situation ever existed. It may
very well be true that once a labor force is highly organized, articulate, and
capable of exercising united economic force vis-a-vis its employer, it is
"allowed by management" to play a role in setting work rules. However, such
cooperative endeavors are likely to arise in the future, as they have in the past,
out of union recognition and successful bargaining under the NLRA model.
Such success should be left to the parties and cannot be fairly imposed by the
government when employer power is central and concentrated and faces
disorganized individual employees.
Designing the contours of what labor and management decide to do in
equalized power situations is an endeavor in which the government in a free
enterprise society should play no role whatsoever. The DOL report argues as
follows:
Government, too, has a legitimate role to play in the process. Government is obliged
to provide a legal system which allows parties to work together to solve their mutual
and individual problems and meet their mutual and individual needs....
.. . The law must respond to two types of individuals - those who desire the
flexibility to cooperate and those who require protection from the unscrupulous.
Government must work to ensure that, if a [labor law] reform [on a cooperative
model] is undertaken, all sides and all points of view are ably represented .... 91

All of this casts government in a completely different role than that
anticipated under the NLRA model. In the NLRA model the role of
government is not to concern itself with, or involve itself in, judging the
results of a properly operating process. How could government judge who
are those "individuals who desire flexibility to cooperate" and those who are
"unscrupulous?" How is it to differentiate the bad guys from the good? Is it
the role of government to make such judgments, especially in the economic
sphere? If it is, should not the required determinations and planning
mechanisms be far more conscious, open, and sophisticated than the
mechanisms now in place? To the degree that the DOL's consideration of a
cooperative model of labor relations merits attention, it merits such attention
only by private actors making decisions based on established and mature
relationships between employers ready to share traditional management
prerogatives and employees who are fully organized, well-established and
equal collective bargaining partners in workplace decision making. Such
situations are comparatively rare in the United States, where only twenty
percent of the workforce is represented, and far less than twenty percent of
employers are ready to share such power. The few, which DOL extols, should
not drive the basic labor policy.
90.
91.

DOL REPORT, supra note 87, at 31-32.
Id. at 30.
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The Need for Reinvigorated Union Power: NLRA Straightjacketing,
Industry Capture, and Politicization

The difference between the goals set in the NLRA in 1935 and current
reality is not that the Act has been too successful, nor is it that labor has
amassed too much power. Rather, the difference is that, after twenty-five
years of advancing toward a goal of establishing collective bargaining and
democratic unionism in the American workplace, the national policy
commitment toward representation in collective bargaining of all American
workers has suffered a twenty-year backslide. The same figures developed by
Professor Weiler which showed real success in the first quarter century after
the NLRA show losses thereafter. Since 1965, labor representation has been
on the decline.
Why has this occurred? The most compelling answer lies in historical
developments similar to those now generating the erosion of trusts in
employee benefit investment management. Just as the bureaucratic dangers
of straightjacketing, industry capture, and politicization are undermining
common law trustees as independent financial decision makers, they are
undermining the expansion of collective bargaining and unionism as the
NLRA's answer to concentrated self-seeking corporate power.
During the NLRA's first twenty-five years, national labor policy sought and
found constant growth toward collective bargaining as the central mechanism
controlling the division of income between management and labor. The
mechanism required minimum governmental intervention or planning.
However, as NLRB organizional and representational rules and policies
became better known, and more and more subject to test and abuse, their
flexibility was reduced. The goal of increased union representation became
frustrated by union certification election procedures which generated an
increasing role for management as an active opponent to union certification.
Gradually this resulted in industry capture that intensified with the Reagan
Revolution and that politicized the system. Professor Weiler again shows this
trend convincingly in a table outlining unfair labor practices by employers.
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TABLE IV
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY EMPLOYERS,

Charges
Against
Employers

Fraction
Found
Meritorious

Year

Certification
Elections

1950

5619

4472

3213

NA

1955

4215

4362

3089

NA

1957

4729

3655

2789

NA

1960

6380

7723

6044

1965

7576

10,931

7367

1970

7773

13,601

9290

1975

8061

20,311

13,426

1980

7296

31,281

18,315

29.1%
(overall)
35.5%
(overall)
34.2%
(overall)
32.3%
(employer)
30.2%
(overall)
39.0%
(employer)
35.7%
(overall)

§ 8(a)3
Charges

1950-198092

Backpay Awards
(Average Amount)

Reinstates

2259
($477)
1836
($428)
1457
($354)
3110
($335)
4644
($599)
6828
($403)
7405
($1524)

2111

15,642
($2054)

10,033

1275
922
1885
5875
3779
3816

In 1939, the NLRB reinstated 7,738 employees who had been discriminatorily discharged due to their involvement with unions. 93 As one would
expect, once the principle of the rights of self-organization had been clearly
enunciated and enforced by the government, the illegal use of the discharge
declined. By 1957 the number of illegally dismissed employees offered rein94
statement by the NLRB was a mere 922.
After 1957, however, there was a suprising reversal of the trend. And by
1980 unfair labor practice charges against employers had risen 750%. Furthermore, by the beginning of this decade, 10,033 employees were entitled to
reinstatement. This number represents a 1000% increase from 1957. 9 5
From his data, Weiler concludes that
• . . [a]stoundingly, then, the current odds are about one in twenty that a union
supporter will be fired for exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a
half-century ago. Such a widespread pattern of employer intimidation has
ramifications that reach far beyond the units in which discharges actually occur. It
fosters an environment in which employees will take
very seriously even subtle
96
warnings about the consequences of joining a union.

Weiler's discussion and statistics demonstrate the trend toward industry
capture of an administrative system established for the express purpose of
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Weiler, supra note 82, at 1780.
Id. at 1779.
Id..
For Weiler's analysis of the data represented by his chart, see id. at 1778-81.
Id. at 1780-81.
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increasing the portion of the American workforce represented by unions.
Clearly, industry capture is undermining that system.
Beyond this, an increased politicization of the process has further
undermined the pro-unionization policy directive of the Act. The Reagan
Administration entered office as a pronounced anti-labor administration, and
statistics compiled by the AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating Committee
indicate that Reagan has used his appointment power to politicize the
NLRB.97
[O]ver the two-year period from September 1983, when President Reagan's
appointees attained a majority on the National Labor Relations Board, through
August 1985, when Member Hunter left the agency for an acknowledged employerside labor practice .... the percentage of unfair labor practice cases decided favorably
to employers remained constant: From September 1984 through August 1985, as
from September 1983 through July 1984, complaints against employers were
sustained in approximately 50% of the contested ...cases, while
complaints against
98
unions were sustained in about 85% of the contested .. cases.

These figures contrast sharply with those from the two previous periods,
during which the Board was dominated first by Republicans, and then by
Democrats. Although different in their political complexions, the Board
chaired by Betty Murphy in the 1975 to 1976 period and the Board chaired by
John Fanning in the 1979 to 1980 period, each ruled against employers and
against unions with almost equal frequency. 99
The same study shows that in representational cases, the percentage
decided in management's favor was thirty-five percent in the 1975 to 1976
period, and forty-six percent in the 1979 to 1980 period. In the 1983 to 1984
period, the percentage of representation cases decided in accord with the
employer's position jumped to seventy-two percent. 10

97.

AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating Comm., NLRB Decisional Pattems: Comparing the Dotson

Board's Record, in THE LABOR LAw EXCHANGE, Dec. 1985, at 8.

98. Id. at 7.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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TABLE V
CONTESTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES
CONTESTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES*
1975-76
1979-80

10 1

1983-84

1984-85

642 (84%)

189 (51%)

206 (52%)

92 (16%)

126 (16%)

181 (49%)

188 (48%)

96 (73%)

84 (74%)

108 (86%)

110 (86%)

36 (27%)

29 (26%)

18 (14%)

18 (14%)

94 (35%)

73 (46%)

63 (72%)

65 (66%)

177 (65%)

86 (54%)

25 (28%)

34 (34%)

Complaint Against Employers Sustained in Whole
or Substantial Part

470 (84%)

Complaint Against Employers Dismissed in Whole
or Substantial Part
Complaint Against Unions Sustained in Whole or
Substantial Part
Complaint Against Unions Dismissed in Whole or
Substantial Part

REPRESENTATION CASES
Decisions in Accord With Employer's Position
Decisions in Accord with Union's Position

In compiling the statistics presented here, all contested decisions in unfair labor practice and representation cases issued
by the NLRB during the time period studied were reviewed, eliminating backpay determinations, work awards under § 10k,
applications for attorneys' fees, cases decided on procedural orjurisdictional grounds, and summary judgments granted in
technical refusal to bargain cases and in uncontested §8(a) and §8(b) cases. Excluded from the sample also were those
contested §8(a) and §8(b) cases in which the result could not fairly be characterized as favorable or unfavorable to the
charged party; for the most part these were the cases in which the board sustained certain of the complaint allegations but
dismissed others of roughly equal number and/or seriousness.

E. Cooperation versus Competition: A Threat to Private Centers of
Workplace Power
Perhaps there is more than meets the eye in the current trend toward
announcing the end of the labor movement and the rise of a new cooperative
era in which labor and management will work together voluntarily without the
need of organizational representation of employees. Cooperation is, of
course, an attractive idea. Who could oppose it? However, those who offer
cooperation in the workplace with a resulting need to replace the NLRA
competitive model, should realize that the cooperative ideal as an engine of
governmental labor policy endangers the NLRA's commitment to free market
control of labor and its costs through balanced collective bargaining.
Concentrated corporate power can not "cooperate" on any truly equal
footing absent forceful collective labor power. Current conservative tax,
antitrust, and financial decision making foster increasing corporate
concentration. Increased support must be generated to foster aggressive
collective employee power as a counterweight.
There is indeed a problem with current American labor law; the policy
goal of collective bargaining as the employer-employee relations system of
choice is in jeopardy. The abandonment of a pronounced and intentional
pro-collective labor system weakens the American market system. A
reinvigorated NLRA offers the best hope of decentralized power in the
workplace without extensive intervention by the government. The NLRA
represented a national policy commitment to the privatization of labor
relations through governmentally fostered private, independent unionism.
101.

Id. at 8.
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The Act should be turned to that purpose again. Professor Weiler, for
example, offered suggestions as to how that might be done.' 0 2 What is
needed in the American workplace is not governmentally fostered
cooperation in the form of corporate volunteerism but rather a renaissance of
the 1935 to 1965 vigorous unionization of the workplace.
IV
CONCLUSION

THE THREAT OF DEPRIVATIZATION AND THE NEED FOR NONCORPORATE,
NONGOVERNMENTAL CENTERS OF POWER

For six years now, the national government has been controlled by
conservatives who claim to be the century's strongest advocates of small
government, privatization, and freely operating nongovernmental power
centers. Surprisingly, over that period, corporate economic power has
become increasingly concentrated while existing noncorporate centers of
economic power have been systematically challenged by governmental
straightjacketing, industry capture, and politicization.
Two of these challenges are evident in the recent trends toward the
deprivatization of the management of employee benefit plan assets, and
support for the replacement of a competitive based employee relations model,
which fosters free union power as a market counterweight to concentrated
corporate power, with a cooperative model, which fosters voluntary joint
employee management cooperation.

102. See Weiler, supra note 82, at 1769-70. Weiler suggests that the goals and purposes of the Act
can be achieved only by replacing the existing structure of the protracted representation campaign
with "instant elections" modeled on the Canadian labor law regime. Id.

